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В дискуссиях вокруг теорий, объясняющих на-
учный прогресс, натуральная философия 
позднесредневекового периода рассматрива-
ется как играющая роль апологетики. Для фи-
лософов науки с их отказом от метафизики за-
дача обеспечения рациональной реконструк-
ции научного прогресса представляется почти 
невозможной. Даже объяснения, предложен-
ные Поппером и Куном, испытывают большие 
трудности и дают лишь частично удовлетвори-
тельные результаты. В своей работе «Логика 
научного исследования» К. Поппер утвержда-
ет, что метафизика играет случайную роль в 
появлении новых научных идей. В свою оче-
редь, в «Структуре научных революций», осу-
ществляя теоретические интерпретации и 
классификацию эмпирических фактов без их 
метафизических предпосылок, Томас Кун при-
ходит к выводу о том, что естествознание 
сформировалось под влиянием ошибочных 
интерпретаций аристотелевской натурфило-
софии средневековыми натурфилософами. 
Это является одной из причин того, что ме-
диевистам до сих пор приходится защищать 
натурфилософию позднего Средневековья от 
поверхностных убеждений в том, что в сред-
невековых университетах вообще не могло 
быть ничего, имеющее значение для совре-
менной науки и философии. Стремясь пред-
ставить фрагмент последовательной реконст-
рукции развития естественной философии, я 
рассматриваю одну из идей позднесредневе-
ковой философии – а именно, объяснение 
движения (импетус). Основной тезис данного 
исследования в том, что идеи позднесредне-
вековой натурфилософии сыграли отнюдь не 
случайную либо отрицательную роль в разви-
тии современного естествознания – напротив, 
они имеют здесь решающее значение. Следуя 
аристотелевскому философскому подходу, 
статья раскроет предпосылки теории импетуса 
Жана Буридана. Затем будут представлены 
дебаты по поводу объяснения движения сна-
ряда, и, наконец, будет выявлено необходи-
мое значение этой метафизической идеи о 
 Julita Slipkauskaitė. The significance of the idea of impetus... 
104  
  
модификациях натурфилософии.  
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In the discourse around theories explaining scien-
tific progress, natural philosophy of the Late Me-
dieval Period is seen as playing the role of apolo-
getics. For philosophers of science, with their re-
pudiation of metaphysics, the task of providing 
a rational reconstruction of how scientific pro-
gress has occurred is nigh on impossible. Even ex-
planations such as the Popperian and the Kuhnian 
strain under great difficulty and provide only part-
ly satisfactory results. In his “Logik der Forschung” 
(1934) Karl Raimund Popper argues that meta-
physics plays an accidental part in the emergence 
of new scientific ideas. Correspondingly, in 
“Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962), by 
carrying out theoretical interpretations and classi-
fication of empirical facts without their meta-
physical premises, Thomas Kuhn comes to the 
conclusion that natural science was formed under 
the influence of erroneous interpretations of Aris-
totelian natural philosophy presented by medie-
val natural philosophers. These are some of the 
reasons why medievalists are still made to defend 
late medieval natural philosophy from shallow 
convictions that at medieval universities nothing 
of any significance to contemporary science and 
philosophy took place at all. Seeking to render 
a fragment of a coherent reconstruction of the 
development of natural philosophy, I will investi-
gate one idea of late medieval philosophy – the 
explanation of motion (impetus). The main 
statement of the paper holds that the ideas of 
late medieval natural philosophy have a decisive 
significance for the development of modern natu-
ral science instead of accidental or negative one. 
In the paper, following Aristotelian philosophical 
approach, premises of Jean Buridan’s theory of 
impetus will be exposed. Then, debates over the 
explanation of projectile motion are going to be 
presented, and finally, the necessary significance 
of this metaphysical idea on the modifications of 
natural philosophy is going to be ascertained.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the discourse around theories explaining scientific progress, an 
important task is to provide a rational and coherent reconstruction of 
how scientific ideas develop. However, in the context of late medieval 
natural philosophy, this task is nigh on impossible. Even explanations 
such as the Popperian and the Kuhnian strain under great difficulty and 
provide only partly satisfactory results. In his “Logik der Forschung” 
(1934) Karl Raimund Popper argues that metaphysics plays an acciden-
tal part in the emergence of new scientific ideas. Correspondingly, in 
“Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962), by carrying out theoretical 
interpretations and classification of empirical facts without their meta-
physical premises, Thomas Kuhn comes to the conclusion that natural 
science was formed under the influence of erroneous interpretations of 
Aristotelian natural philosophy given by medieval natural philosophers. 
Thus, natural philosophy of the Late Medieval Period is still seen as 
playing the role of apologetics and needs to be defended from shallow 
convictions that at medieval universities nothing of any significance to 
contemporary science and philosophy took place at all. 
The research is based on a premise that two ancient Greek philoso-
phical systems had a significant impact on forming the conception of 
natural philosophy in the Middle Ages. The systems are Platonic and 
Aristotelian. Without metaphysical premises, they also included theo-
logical ones [Crombie, 1953; McKeon, 1930; Wallance, 1972].  
Briefly, Crombie states that the most striking changes in history of 
science are for the most part brought about by new conceptions of scien-
tific procedure. Since the rational explanation contained in scientific 
texts confronted significantly with empiricism in practical arts in twelfth 
and early thirteenth centuries, questions concerning reality and truth 
were being posed as a special part of a single philosophical activity, 
“natural science”. And it was metaphysics that played a big part in pro-
viding every science with necessary characteristics of reality [Crombie, 
1953, p. 1–2]. Wallance documents the legacy of Greek science and 
treats how Platonic currents merged with Aristotle’s thought as they 
were transmitted to the Latin West. 13
th
and 14
th
centuries are regarded as 
centuries of shaping scientific explanation, causal terminology, develop-
ing consistent methodological tradition that continued all the way to the 
founders of modern science [Wallance, 1972, p. 10–11]. McKeon’s 
statement is even more straightforward. The problem of knowledge has 
been investigated through the whole age of Western philosophy and the 
significant characteristics of philosophy have been determined in large 
part by the answer which has been given in each case to the problem of 
how we know: “if the Platonist turned to God and eternal ideas in an-
swer to the question of how we know, the Aristotelian sought the an-
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swer in terms and ideas, and in their combinations and separations, 
which are accomplished by the human intellect. ... It was the Aristote-
lian logic and the Platonist philosophy, not science, which first turned 
philosophers of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the data of 
experience” [McKeon, 1930, p. xi–xii].  
The main statement of the paper holds that the ideas of late medieval 
natural philosophy have a decisive significance in the development of 
modern natural science instead of accidental or negative one. In order to 
prove the statement, I will firstly investigate Popperian and Kuhnian 
attitudes towards the importance of metaphysical systems to the devel-
opment of scientific ideas. Secondly, following Aristotelian philosophi-
cal approach, I will analyse Jean Buridan’s explanation of projectile 
motion and its premises. Lastly, I will establish their significance to 
a coherent reconstruction of scientific development. 
 
2. Accidental and negative significance of metaphysical ideas 
to scientific change 
 
In Kuhnian and Popperian theories around explaining scientific 
change, medieval natural philosophy is considered to be significant to 
the development of scientific ideas only for: 
1) Accidental and psychological importance of metaphysical ideas for 
the advance of science throughout history [Popper, 2002, p. 16], 
which could be equated to any other non-scientific cause, for ex-
ample, newly emerging universities [Grant, 1996, p. 32]. 
2) The negative effect that “the series of crises” caused by Aristoteli-
an researchers had on Galileo’s views [Kuhn, 1996, p. 123]. 
In the first instance, for Popper, the question of how a new idea oc-
curs is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge, but may 
be of great interest to empirical psychology. The former is concerned 
with questions of justification or validity (quid juris) only, and may be 
logically examined. The latter is concerned with the process involved in 
the stimulation and release of an inspiration: metaphysical realism, ac-
cording to Popper, can only give a methodologist “some intuitive en-
couragement, some hope, but no assurance of any kind. And although a 
rational treatment of methodology may be said to depend upon an as-
sumed, or conjectured, aim of science, it certainly does not depend upon 
the metaphysical and most likely false assumptions that the true struc-
tural theory of the world (if any) can be stated in human language” 
[Popper, 2013, p. 146]. Thus, there is a sharp distinction between the 
process of conceiving a new idea and the methods and results of exam-
ining it logically. Therefore, the logic of knowledge and the psychology 
of knowledge stand in contradistinction to one another [Popper, 2002, 
p. 7–8]. 
As for the second instance, by carrying out theoretical interpreta-
tions and classification of empirical facts without their metaphysical 
premises, Thomas Kuhn comes to the statement that natural science was 
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formed under the influence of erroneous interpretations of Aristotelian 
natural philosophy presented by medieval natural philosophers. Com-
paring Nicole Oresme’s and Galilei’s explanations of the motion of 
a pendulum, Kuhn states that Aristotelians deployed different conceptu-
al categories when they dealt with a falling body. Deploying different 
conceptual categories had created different experiences and had formed 
intellectual changes that produced Galilei’s laws: “Normal research 
guided by them could not have produced the laws that Galileo discov-
ered. It could only – and by another route it did – lead to the series of 
crises from which Galileo’s view of the swinging stone emerged. 
As a result of those crises and of another intellectual changes besides, 
Galileo saw the swinging stone quite differently” [Kuhn, 1996, p. 123]. 
For Popper, metaphysics plays an accidental role in the emergence 
of new ideas and is not linked to a rational reconstruction of scientific 
ideas. To Kuhn’s scope, metaphysical premises are disregarded, there-
fore the inquiry into nature is expressed in the need to systematise facts 
instead of the need to understand nature. Kuhn’s aim to describe scien-
tific development of research paradigms, erroneously, reinforces 
the preconception that at medieval universities nothing of any signifi-
cance to contemporary science took place at all. Moreover, in both ex-
planatory systems natural science is autonomous: it describes its own 
principles and itself determines its development.  
 
3. The reconstruction of the idea of impetus 
 
This paper uses Jean Buridan’s theory of impetus and Nicole 
Oresme’s notion of empty space as one of the best examples that show 
how metaphysical and theological premises play much more important 
role in defining and developing natural inquiry than Popper and Kuhn 
had indicated. Besides, the theory of impetus is a good solution to Aris-
totle’s projectile motion problem. Therefore, I will briefly describe the 
main aspects of Aristotle’s explanation of a motion of a falling body, 
then the main characteristics of the theory of impetus and how it condi-
tions explanations of empty space and the philosophical inquiry into 
nature. 
For Aristotle, scientific knowledge stems from a grasp of principles, 
causes and elements of a subject. It is the first step that needs to be tak-
en to gain scientific knowledge of nature [Arist. Phys. I.1, 184a10-a16, 
trans. Waterfield]. Because of that, the explanation of projectile motion 
requires continuous efficient causation. In Aristotle’s case, such effi-
cient causation was the air “for air is both light and heavy, and thus qua 
light produces upward motion, being propelled and set in motion by the 
force, and qua heavy produces a downward motion. In either case the 
force transmits the movement to the body by first, as it were, tying it up 
in the air” [Arist. DC, III. 2, 301b23-27, trans. Stocks]. 
This explanation was actively interpreted by via moderna natural 
philosophers “as implying that a projectile, on leaving the hand or 
mechanism of projection, was kept in motion either by some extrinsic 
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cause such as the air, or by an intrinsic cause, a fluxus formae or a forma 
fluens, such as the impetus impressus postulated by the French physi-
cist, Jean Buridan” [Crombie, 1953, p. 175–176].  
Impetus was introduced as an effect that produces continuous effi-
cient causation for the motion of a projectile. It also served the purpose 
of solving Aristotle’s conceptual problems about the effect of the heavi-
ness of a body for its natural and constrained movements. Buridan ar-
gues: 
“Thus, we can and ought to say that in the stone or other projectile 
there is impressed something which is the motive force (virtus moti-
va) of that projectile. And this is evidently better than falling back 
on the statement that the air continues to move that projectile. 
For the air appears rather to resist. Therefore, it seems to me that it 
ought to be said that the motor in moving a moving body impresses 
(imprimit) in it a certain impetus (impetus) or a certain motive force 
(vis motiva) of the moving body, [which impetus acts] in the direc-
tion toward which the mover was moving the moving body, either 
up or down, or laterally, or circularly. And by the amount the motor 
moves that moving body more swiftly, by the same amount it will 
impress in it a stronger impetus. It is by that impetus that the stone 
is moved after the projector ceases to move. But that impetus is con-
tinually decreased (remittitur) by the resisting air and by the gravity 
of the stone, which inclines it in a direction contrary to that in which 
the impetus was naturally predisposed to move it. Thus, the move-
ment of the stone continually becomes slower, and finally that impe-
tus is so diminished or corrupted that the gravity of the stone wins 
out over it and moves the stone down to its natural place” [Buridan, 
1959, p. 534–535]. 
Not only was Buridan’s concept proposed “as a further development 
of Aristotle’s theory of motion, wherein the distinction between natural 
and violent (compulsory) still obtained” [Wallance, 1981, p. 42], but the 
concept also shows how the inquiry into the natural world is imple-
mented into Aristotelian metaphysical system.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Comparing Popperian and Kuhnian attitudes towards the importance 
of metaphysics in natural inquiry for scientific change with Jean Buri-
dan’s theory of impetus, Aristotelian metaphysical system and the study 
of nature in Late Medieval Period, we are likely to come to the conclu-
sion that neither Popperian nor Kuhnian explanations decently qualify 
for the aims of this paper. Unlike Popperian and Kuhnian explanations 
of scientific development, accepting Aristotelian system of philosophi-
cal inquiry into nature gives us access to further investigations of how 
scientific ideas had been developing over Late Medieval Period. 
The example above shows that (1) Aristotelian metaphysical system 
embodies the forming of methodological foundations of inquiry into 
nature in late medieval Western Europe [Plėšnys, 1999, p. 5]. (2) In the 
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th
 century, before any significant revisions in Aristotelian natural phi-
losophy, smaller incremental departures of exact sciences from natural 
philosophy were taking place. They were enough to fashion a spirit of 
inquiry, that may have provoked the Scientific Revolution [Grant, 2011, 
p. 106], but they were not as thoroughgoing as to have been considered 
independently from metaphysical contexts. 
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